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THE FILED RATE IN PUBLIC UTILITY LAW: A
STUDY IN MECHANICAL JURISPRUDENCE
GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON
INTRODUCTION

Once this or that type of business is labelled "public utility," 1 the modem la-* governing the subject falls into two grand
divisions. As the special duties which society imposes are no
2
longer left to common law statement, the first is the reading of

the legislative language prescribing the duties. These are cast
in such general terms that this is largely fictional interpretation
in the light of current social theory3 Statute-makers recognize,
perforce, the human incapacity to prevision the myriad and

kaleidoscopically-changing

fact situations which arise 4 and

which must be met, not on any theory of precedents, but on their
'See the writer's The Public Utility Concept in American Law (1928) 41
HAiy. L. Rnv. 277, for the history and the processes of the labelling.
uForty-seven states have public utility acts; only Delaware was without
one. See Note (1926) 25 Micur. L. REv. 178. In, i2 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws tentatively adopted a
Uniform Act drafted by Professor E. B. Stason of Michigan. PaocmDMEMNG (1927) 721. It does not
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include the regulation of steam railroads, and it is largely concerned with the
agency for, and mechanics of, regulation. The duties of the utilities are
stated-and properly-in the usual general terms,.and occupy only three pages
out of forty-one.
I GRAY, NA'r.mE A SouRcEs oF THm LAw (2d ed. x921) 124, 172, deals
with the statute as material for law to be worked out by the courts. This
is particularly true in the public utility field. R. T. Ely, in PRoPERTY AND
WmLTir, at 206, discusses the judicial function in like terms.
' The proposed Uniform aw, supra note 2, simply recites:
"SEcTIoN 2. [Rates] . . . Every rate made, -demanded or received by
any public utility shall be just and reasonable. . . :'
"SECTION 3. [Service] . . . Every public utility shall furnish adequate,
efficient, and reasonable service." Section 4 provides that every utility shall
file and publish rates; section 5,that none shall depart from them; and section 6,
that none shall as to rates or service make any unreasonable preference.
These wordings are typical of the statutes actually in force. Their vagueness has been in many cases subjected to attack as defining no standard for
administration, but as the late Justice McKenna replied, in a case famous in
the history of administrative agencies, "general terms, get precision from the
sense and experience of men and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of the instances of their application
would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and
experience, therefore, the law properly relies." Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U. S.230, 246, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 392 (1915) (censorship).
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own circumstances. 5 "Interpretation" thus comes close to "social engineering."
The second has to do with the attainment of the results intended. Though commensurate attention has not always been
given in other lines to making legal rules effective, 6 our present
society has devised, in the commission, a special agency for making, in the utility field, "law in book" a "law in action." The
reading of the legislative intentions and their effective carrying
out are alike affected by traditions of free business and of free
contract. And traditions of general individualism, and of fair
play between the citizen and the state, combine with traditional
dreads of a discretion which only the expert can check up, to
affect particularly the enforcement phases. In both divisions,
therefore, "constitutional law" bulks larg.
The present paper concerns society's intention that public
utilities shall deal with their customers on a basis of equality of
treatment, and devotes itself to that current device for securing
its accomplishment which is, in a measure, a throw-back to what
an eminent legal philosopher calls the period of "strict law." 7
Therein the chief end of law was certainty; rules were wholly
inelastic and inflexible, and formalism reigned. It reigned as
the "twin sister of liberty," as Jhering said, because it paid its
way in compensations. The present device is tolerable for like
reasons. It represents a choice of what is rated the lesser evil.
In itself it is simple enough. It is that the utility's charges
be publicly filed," and be stuck to. The mechanical application
"'The commission and the utility are not dealing with a purely legal
proposition subject to inflexible rules of law, but with an. ever-changing
economic condition, with powers adapted to fit recurring changes in economic
life." Kephart, J., in Coplay Co. v. Public Service Comm., 271 Pa. 58, 64, 114

Aft. 649, 65x (1921).

See Pound, The Enforcement of Law (19o9) 2

GRex BAG 401.

See Pound, The Ev;d of Law as Developed in,
Legal Rides and Doe-

fres (1913) 27 HARv.L. Ruv. i95, 204.
' The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 25 STAT.
855 (1889), 34 STAT. 586 (1906), 41 STAT. 483 (1920), 49 U. S. C. §6 (1)
(x926),

reads: "Every common carrier subject to

file with the commission

.

.

.

this chapter shall

. . . and print and keep open to public inspection schedules showing all the rates, fares, and charges . . " The act
also provides, 34 STAT. 587 (i9o6), as amended, 41 STAT.483 (192?), 49 U.S. C.
.§6 (7) (1926):. "No carier . . . shall engage . . . in transportation . . . unless the rates, fares, and charges . . . have been filed and
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adds "stuck to regardless of the moral deserts involved in the
circumstances." Intrinsically, as a device for equality of treatment, it has nothing to do ,vith the amount of the charge; but
when, as part of the enforcement of the utility's duty to serve
at reasonable rates, public regulation sets the actual figures,9 they
serve as did those set by the utility.
Leaving its "reasonableness" aside, a rate once flied and published establishes a most-neatly-to-be-administered bit of mechanism for combating discrimination. It serves as a common
denominator among customers, and as a yardstick wherewith
regulations and litigation measure off the utility's treatment of
them. Charging them with notice 1 0 of its figures makes it a
boomerang against the customers, themselves, in the cases where
it has been applied to fied limitations of liability.' Its mechanpublished . . .; nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation

. . . than the . . .

tariff filed" The Elkins Act § i,infra note 15, makes the carrier's "willful
failure to file and publish," or "strictly to observe," a misdemeanor and adds,
"and it shall be unlawful for (any carrier or shipper) to offer, grant or give,
or to solicit, accept, or receive any rebate, concession, or discrimination . . .
whereby any . . . property shall by any device whatever be transported at
a less rate than . . . the tariffs filed . . "' The filed rate "as against

such carrier, its officers or agents, in any prosecution begun under this Act shall
be conclusively deemed to be the legal rate, and any departure from such rate,
or any offer to depart therefrom, shall be deemed an offense under this
section

.

.

'

The Uniform Act § 5, s£pra note 2, at 740, provides: "No public utility shall

directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever . . . charge, etc, a
greater or less compensation . . . than that prescribed in the schedules
. . . filed . . 2' The note to it adds that the provision is in practically

all of the statutes and was originally taken from the Interstate Commerce Act.
*This has precipitated a major politico-economic controversy. Theoretically
society's presumably primary interest in good service should make it willing to
pay what good service costs. But there is more political capital in crying down
rates than in crying up service; and the public setting or sanctioning of.rates
comes close to an experiment in finding the least financial bait which will keep
private investment in the public utility field. For an expository treatment of the
subject, see the writer's The Valuation War (x928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 243.
" "The tariff, so long as it is of force, is, in respect of rates named, to be
treated as though it were a statute, binding as such upon railroad and shipper
alike. Penna. R. R. v. International Coal Co., 2,30 U. S. i84 Robinson V. B.
& 0. R. CO., = U. S. 5o6 . . 2' Pillsbury Flour Mills v. Gt. Northern
Ry., 25 F. (2d) 66, 68 (C.C. A. 8th, 1928).
'In Boston & Maine R. R.v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97,34 Sup. Ct. 526 (1914),
a traveller stubbornly fought, up to the highest court, only to be there informed
that the $ioo limitation as filed determined the amount of recovery. A note
in (1914) 2 HAxv. L. REv. 737, says, "This seems a startling result," but the
Supreme Court impressed it again in Galveston, etc., Ry. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S.
357, 41 Sup. Ct. 114 (igzo), as to a baggage loss. And in Western Union Tel.

Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U. S.566,41 Sup. Ct. 584 (ig2i), in applying it to unset
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ical administration has resulted in making it a bed of Procrustes,
wherein "John Doe suffers for the good of the Commonwealth,"
in that customers have suffered from the policy of not charging
to the utility the cost of its blunders. These instances, where
the customer and the utility are not together engaged in a design
to defeat the equality doctrine, furnish the interesting examples
of the mechanical application of the fied-rate policy.
NON-NECESSITY FOR PARTICIPATION OF CARRIER AND SIIPPER
IN DISCRIIuNATION

In the matter of allowances by the utility for work done by
the customer 2---over which the watch dogs of the non-discrimination policy are necessarily vigilant-an elevator concern .was
recently convicted of discrimination under circumstances which
are peculiar. In U. S. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons,l3" the latter
in their business received grain from Great Lakes vessels and
loaded it upon cars. For their services the carriers' filed tariff
gave them one cent per bushel. 14 This they "split" with the
owners of the grain. The business purpose was of course to divert the grain stream to and through their elevator. An indictment, which relied upon this division as a rebating "device"
under the act, was demurred to by the Kelloggs, because they
a verdict for $3i,ooo damages in favor of a limitation of .4.65, the Court reached
a result so startling, that the Commerce Commission raised the limitation
figures.
I The Interstate Commerce Act, 34 STAT. 590 (I906), as amended, 36 STAT.
553 (190), 49 U. S. C. § 15 (x3) (1926), reads: "If the owner . . . renders
any service connected with transportation . . . the Commission may . . .
determine -what is a reasonable charge . . . to be paid by the carrier."
1312 F. (2d) 612 (W. D. N. Y. 1926), aff'd, 20 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927), commented on in (1928) :28 Cot. L. R-v. 5o7, certiorari denied, 275
U. S. 566, 48 Sup. Ct. 122 (1927).
" Such an allowance was held to be proper, and not to be properly denied
to an elevator owner 'who shipped his own grain, in Interstate Commerce Comm.
v. Diffenbaugh, =nn U. S. 42, 32 Sup. Ct. 22 (Igi9). But in the present
instance, the railroad refused to pay the one cent because, it argued, it would
thereby subject itself to punishment under the Elkins Act. A New York court
in Kellogg & Sons v. D. L. & W. Co., 204 App. Div. 243, it9g N. Y. Supp.
951 (1g22), required the payment. Of this the Circuit Court of Appeals said,
20 F. (2d) 459, 462 (C. C. A. 2d, 192):
"The civil liability there imposed
. . . did not determine the criminal liability (of the Kellogg concern). The
penalty is imposed here, not because it 'was acting for the carrier, but because
it performed a service in transportation, and gave a rebate to its shipper . . .
from the compensation received for that part 'which it performed'
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were "not common carriers or agents of the riilroad . . (and)
that they acted in their own interests .... " The act cannot
be so narrowly construed, replied the trial court; and the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the relation to the carrier is
not a necessary basis for responsibility.
The Spenwer Kellogg case shows that the filed rate policy
may be invaded, though the carrier itself is not involved, and that
the carrier's filed rate may serve as a yardstick for the condemnation of at least a participant in the forwarding of the commodity, although the act reads that the filed "rate as against such
carrier, its officers or agents . . . shall conclusively be deemed
the legal rate . . . and any departure from such rate . . . an
offence under this section . . . " 1 In it there was no question as to the meaning of the tariff. The latter was understandable on its face, and its face revealed nothing to question. The
business reasons of the elevator people were simply incompatible
with the non-discrimination theory.
In a previous case the Supreme Court dealt with a filed rate
schedule which on its face raised a question, in that it recited
simply that from the rate stated a "lateral allowance" was made
without stating its figures. The carrier made the allowance agreed
upon, and was convicted of rebating. The court said:
".. . no
arise. We
law, and its
it from the

question of the defendant's good faith could
may assume its intention to comply with the
effort to ascertain its duty; but we cannot relieve
consequences of mistake." 1

When, however, they shipper was prosecuted under the Elkints
Act for accepting the same "lateral allowance," his good faith
saved him.1 7 Thus inens rea of some sort was required for con-

'Elkins Act, 32 STAT. 847 (19o3), as amended 34 STAT. 587, 588 (i9o6),
49 U. S. C. §41 (1z6).
" C. R. R. N. J. v. U. S., 29 Fee. 5o, 509 (C. C. A. 3d, 1915), certiorari
denied, 241 U.'S. 658, 36 Sup. Ct. 446 (Eg16).
I"Lehigh Coal & Navig. Co.v. U. S., 25o U. S. 556,40 Sup. Ct. 24 (1919).
The case is discussed in (92o) 33 HRv.L. REv. 6o6. "Good faith" in filing
a blind tariff has more merit than good faith in other respects. In U. S. v.
Illinois Cent. P, R, 263 U. S.515, 523, 44 Sup. Ct. 189, 192 (1924), the Court
said: "The effort of a carrier to obtain more business, and to retain that which
it had secured proceeds from the motive of self-interest which is recognized
as legitimate; and the fact 'that preferential rates were given only for this
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victing the shipper, but the carrier was convicted simply for not
charging the tariff filed. The reason for this particular separability in the "lateral allowance" cases is not so clear.
One may rejoice, however, in the separableness in U. S. v.
Koenig Coal Co.,1 8 where, on the theory that section i of the
EIkhns Act applied only when both shipper and carrier were participants in guilt, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the
indictment.19 The circumstances evoke sympathy neither for the
defendants nor for the lower court's theory. The facts were
that the Commerce Commission had exercised its emergency
authority 2 0 by giving preference, in a coal tie-up, to coal for the
use of hospitals. The Koenig Coal Company designated as for
the use of a named hospital in Detroit, a shipment wherewith to
fill an order from a Detroit factory. This was the "device" relied upon in the indictment.
Upsetting the theory below, Taft, C. J., for the Court, said:
"This (section) makes it unlawful for any one to receive any concession . . . whereby any advantage is given

or any discrimination is practiced. The facts charged bring
what was done exactly within this description. It was a
priority or preference in securing the transportation of coal
in an emergency. .

.

. It was certainly a concession and

one of value to one who under the law or the regulations
having the force of law could not secure that priority . . .
it was unlawful, and he (the carrier) did not know the facts
which made it so. The shipper knew them because he had
secured it by his deceit, and received it. What is there in
the statute that releases him from guilt, because the carrier who yielded to him the concession and gave him the
advantage and made the discrimination thought it was lawful?" 21
purpose relieves the carrier from any charge of favoritism or malice. But
preferences may inflict undue prejudice though the carrier's motives in. granting
them are honest'
'27o U. S. 512, 46 Sup. Ct. 392 (1926).
"r F. (2d) 738 (E. D. Mich. 1924).
:Under the Act of 92o, 41 STAT. 476 (1920), 49 U.. S. C. § 1 (i5) (1926),
which provides, by amendment to 40 STAT. 101 (1917), that the Commission

may do so.
2 Supro note 18, at 518, 46 Sup. Ct. at 394.
In. U. S. v. Michigan Port-land Cement Co., 27o U. S. 521, 46 Sup. Ct. 395 (1926), decided on the same
day, the facts were similar, but counsel was inspired to the defense that § i
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CONSTRUCTION OF FILED RATES

Whether to resolve in favor- of shipper or of carrier the
ambiguities of a tariff conceded to be properly filed was before
the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Loatrop.2 2 Although the filed tariff has the force
of a statute in the sense of ignzorantia neminem excusat in the
matter of the amount of rates and of limitations of recovery for
loss, 23 the court nevertheless favored the shipper, in a. dispute

as to which of two sections applied. "Admittedly it (the issue)
is to be resolved by reference to the tariffs alone, and if they
are ambiguous, they must be construed favorably to the shippers. . . . Furthermore, the intention of the carrier is competent only in so far as it is fairly expressed in the language
of the printed rates." The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. 2 4
In PillsburyFlour Mills Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 2 5 there
is a general exposition:
of the Elkins Act, sipra notes 8 and xS, had no teeth except as to "a concession
or discrimination which violates a tariff published and filed," to which Taft,
C. J., replied at 525, 46 Sup. Ct at 396: "Service Order No. 23 herein was
issued under the Transportation Act and had the force of law. Avent v.
United States . . . 266 U. S. 127, 131 . . .; United States v. Grimaud,
. . . 22o U. S. 5o6 . . . In the absence of a specific requirement for its

publication in a tariff, either in the act authorizing the service order, or in
the Elkins Act, we can find no reason for making it essential in the enforcement of the statute, and no case is cited to suggest one."
15 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 9th,

1926).

= See supra note x. A recent case on the practice of making the owner a
co-insurer with the carrier, in such a fashion that recovery is pro-rated, is
Mallison v. Barrett, 215 App. Div. 524, 213 N. Y. Supp. 652 (1926), discussed
in (x926) 40 Hnv. L. REv. x28. The New York court required pro-rating.
Although this is apparently becoming the general view, it is a regrettable and
unnecessary extension of the limitation principle.
2'273 U. S. 742, 47 Sup. Ct 336 (1927).
= 25 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).

The carrier sued for an unpaid
balance and won on the dispute as to which item of tariff applied to a shipment
of bran "other than flax." Whether it fell under the rate for "bran, except
flax bran," in list No. 2, or "feed, mill" in list No. 3, was the question. The
variance was some $3oo in favor of list No. 2.
Nothing is said in the opinion of the possible aspect of the case as the
basis of a reparation suit before the commission, with the necessity of its
antecedent finding as an administrative question of which of the two sections
should apply. But in Ingills v. Maine Cent. R. R., 24 F. (2d) 113 (D. C. Me.
1928), where there appeared the ever-arising question whether the shipment
was a through interstate, or a combination of intrastate local hauls with a.
break at an intrastate point, the court found there was no break, and said, at
113: "The point is made by -the defendants that this is afi administrative ques-
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".. the construction of a railroad tariff is not a matter
sui generis. It 'presents ordinarily a question of law, which

does not differ in character from those presented when the
construction of any other document is in dispute.' Great
Northern Ry-. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. "S. 285,
291. While there may be some rules of construction peculiarly applicable to a railroad tariff, yet ordinarily the rules
governing the construction of other documents have been
applied by the courts to such tariffs."
Neatly avoiding what the technically-minded might make
a formidable question, the court added:
"Whether the tariff, being statutory in character, is to
be treated as subject to the rules for the construction of statutes, or, being contractual in character, is to be treated as
subject to the rules for the construction of contracts, we
need not determine; for so far as the case at bar is concerned, the rules which are common both to the construction of statutes and contracts are applicable. . . . It is
. an elementary rule of statutory construction that
general and specific provisions in apparent contradiction may
subsist together-the specific qualifying and supplying emceptions to the general." 26
It specifically repudiated the claim that in cases where more than
one tariff designation might be applied the shipper is entitled to
the lower rate.
tion, that should be decided by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that
this court, under the Commerce Act, has no jurisdiction. This suit, however,
involves only a construction of the published rates of the carriers and their
application to certain shipments. Here, as in the case of Great Northern R. Co.
v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285,

42

S. Ct. 477

.

.

.

'the task

to be performed is to determine the meaning of words of the tariff, which were
used in their ordinary sense, and to apply that meaning to the undisputed facts.'
See also Gimbel Bros. v. Barrett (D. C.) 21.5 F. ioo4.
"There were through rates established and effective, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, applicable to shipments of grain from points of
origin in this case to Bridgeton. Where a through rate is in effect between
two points, that is the only legal rate between those points under the Commerce
Act."
'Ibid. 68. The court went on -to hold that the bran shipped "was also a
mill feed. But the term 'mill feed' included other commodities beside bran.
'Bran' was the specific designation; 'feed, mill,' the general designation. Both
designations and both rates may stand, if we apply the first rule above stated
-and consider the specific commodity 'bran as being excepted from the general
class 'feed, mill.'"

FILED RATE IN PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
FILED RATES AND 'TREE CONTRACT"

A. Special Service Arrangements
What is a utility to do when service is asked for which no
rate is on file? The Interstate Commerce Act tells the carrier he
must "provide . .
transportation," 27 but it also tells him
he shall not "engage . . . in the transportation . . . unless
the rates . . . upon which the same (the passengers or prop" 28
erty) are transported have been filed and published ...
The cases have stressed the latter provision, and in Texas& Pacific Ry. v. American Tie Co, 291 the shipper's suit for damages
for the carrier's refusal to take and transport, failed.
Upon this dilemma the late Judge Hough took a characteristically direct grip in Swift & Co. v. New York Cent. R. R.-"
There was no tariff for a haul from "ship's side"-in this instance in Brooklyn-to a pier at the foot of Thirty-third Street,
Manhattan. There was one for "ship's side' to Weehawken on
the Jersey side of the Hudson (across from the foot of Thirtythird Street), and a second thence to the pier. The carrier collected the sum of the two filed rates. No physical reason existed
why the transportation could not take the direct line, and shortly
after the carrier filed a single rate for the direct service. The
commission gave Swift & Co. the difference between this last
and what they had paid, but the District Court dismissed the suit
on-the reparation order. In reversing, Hough, Cir. J., said:
"As it is not suggested that they could refuse the goods,
or that they wished to refuse them, we shall assume that
their duty-as common carriers extended to the transportation
of these goods. . ..
If any ship within lighterage limits
in New York Harbor was a 'point on its own route,' then
it was obligatory under the statute to publish and charge a
reasonable rate from that ship to any other point on defendants' line. But it does not follow that defendants had
the impossible task of anticipating the arrival of ships and
7Ibid. 69. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 36 STAT. 544 (xo), 40 STAT.
101 (1917), 41 STAT. 475 (i920), 49 U. S. C. § i
I§ 6 (7), supra note 8.
2234 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 885 (1914).
316 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).

(4) (1926).
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the transportation from unexpected ships to unusual points
of any and all cargoes, because, under subdivision 4 of section i the duty was to 'provide and furnish such transportation upon reasonable request therefore, and to establish
through routes and just and reasonable rates,' etc. Comp.
St. § 8563.
"It was perfectly possible, when the . . . request was

made instantly to declare and publish a rate. . .this litigation has arisen from a queerly legalistic way of looking at
so broad and fundamental a statute as the Interstate Commerce Act.

.

. . because defendants were taken by sur-

prise at a request for direct transportation to Thirty-third
Street, they did no more than slavishly follow any existing
routes, however circuitous, that would lead from the Brooklyn shore to Thirty-third Street, Manhattan. . .

'We

performed what seemed to be a.very foolish service; yet we
had no alternative,' (they say).
"There was an alternative; i.e., the law not only permitted, but required, a tariff to be instantly proclaimed to
suit the service which the defendants were willing to perform." 31l

In the case just discussed the meat came through safely, but'
Blodget & Co. v. New York CentralR. R.,31 presents the combination of a haulage undertaken for which no rate was on file,
plus an injury to the goods in transit. Blodget asked for and
was given a sound refrigerator car for the transport of celery
in mid-December from Rochester, New York, into Massachusetts. The denial of recovery for freezing could actually have
'Ibid. I8. In Davis, Agent v. Kelly-Weber Co., z4 F. (2d) 7oS (W. D.
La. 1927), railroads under government control carried carload straw for delivery
at Camp Hancock at Wheless, Ga., from interior Louisiana points. They
charged intrastate carload rates, which were iocents per xoo, to New Orleans,
plus a through rate from New Orleans to Wheless, which was 3o.5 cents. It
appeared, however, that this combination had been previously cancelled, leaving
carload rates only from New Orleans to Georgia. The railroad now sued to
recover for the intrastate haul at less-than-carload rates, amounting to 65 cents
per io0.Denying recovery, the court handled the situation commendably, but
by main strength, simply saying, at 7o9: "However, I do not think this justifies the application of the exorbitant less than carload rate, which would have
the effect practically of confiscation, or more than equal the -value of the
property shipped. Such a rule violates the principle that, where no other rates
are published, the lowest combination of intermediate rates should be used,
and I can see no more reason in the circumstances for applying the less than
carload intrastate tariffs than there was for using those covering carload shipiments."
'= 's9 N. E. 45 (Mass. 1927); discussed in (1928)
2S Cot. L. Rnv. 666.
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been put upon the point which the court makes that: "A carrier,
in the absence of agreement to do so, is not bound to heat cars
to protect perishable goods from freezing," and that as on the
facts freezing might be expected the shipper "takes the risk himself." a3
On the topic of the published tariff the court said:
"Not only was the defendant under no obligation to
heat the car to protect the celery from freezing, but, under
the provisions of the classifications and tariffs, it had no
legal right to do so. . . . to furnish heat in cars would
be to allow the shippers something which would affect the
value of the service rendered without compensatiodf therefor." "
In the very case the shipment suffered for lack of a provision which was not undertaken by the railroad. A question
might arise if the shipper had wrongfully-in the sense that he
was making an arrangement for special treatment in a matter in
which the contract field is closed-asked for, and the carrier
had undertaken to provide heat, and the injury to the celery had
been due to lack of heat, or to, say, trainwreck or other -matter
unconnected with heating, would the situation be so illegal that
the shipper's recovery would be barred? Does the filed .tariff
policy go that far?
Where the loss follows the not doing of an extra-tariff
service actually undertaken, the well-known series of cases, of
which Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Kirby 3s is an example, furnishes an answer, at least where the damage is other than directly
to the shipment during transit. In the Kirby case, the carrier's
failure to give an expedited service resulted in the loss of a special market, for which damages were asked and denied. They
arose directly out of the breach of the forbidden "contract." If
the horses had died as a result of the length of the ordinary
transit which they actually took, it would seem that the special
contract would not bear on the matter one way or the other, and
2Supra note 32,

at 47.

"Supra note 32, at 48. The provisions are given in the opinion.

=225 U. S. 155, 32 Sup. Ct. 648 (1912).
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it would not be necessary to talk of punishing Kirby by the loss
of his horses for having made it. Had they been injured in the
course of the journey in a manner which would ordinarily make
the carrier liable, it is hard to believe that the filed rate policy
requires that the law withdraw its aid from the parties entirely,30
with regard to injuries in ordinary service, merely because they
had made a forbidden contract for a service not given. Even
where the injury, otherwise compensable, was the result of the
performance -of the special contract, it is hard to believe the
filed rate policy goes so far as to deny recovery in such a case.
Yet in Payne v. Bassett,"' a Texas court denied a recovery
making the penalty substantially the forfeiture of the thing
shipped, which in that case was silverware lost enroute, which
had been shipped as "one box of cut glass," and Gontained in
the box with some cut glass, as was explained to the carrier's
local agent. There was no rate on file for silverware. The court
said:
.
. the law requiring a fixed and published rate establishes a public policy, and a contract to transport goods by
freight expressly forbidden to be so transported and without a rate fixed and published, such transaction would be
in contravention of public policy." -3
In the analogous case of an individual riding "wrongfully"
in the same sense, Pitney, J., said, in Souther. Pacific Co. v.
Schuyler: a0
"Whether the Hepburn Act prohibits a carrier from
giving free transportation to the employees of the Railway
Mail Service when they are not on duty but are travelling
for their own benefit or pleasure, is of course a Federal
question.
'In
the Kirby case the carrier certainly could sue for the filed rate applicable to the service actually performed. Surely the Westinghouse Kerr case,

discussed infra p.

227,

does not bar that.

7'aS S. W. 917 (Tex. Civ. App. I92I). It is noted with approval in
Rights inder Contracts hs Violation of the Interstate Commerce Act C092)
22 Cor. L. Rnv. 564. The writer points out that the "voidness" of the contract
means that its specific performance may not be had; nor damages for its breach.
These are settled points.
IsSupra note 37, at 922.
'*227 U. S. 6or, 6ro, 33 Sup. Ct. 277, 280 (1912).
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"But whether . . . the relation of carrier and passenger arises in the case of gratuitous passage under circumstances such as are presented in this case, is (in the
absence of an act of Congress regulating the matter) a
question not of Federal but of state law.
"But the act itself declares what penalty shall be imposed for a violation of its prohibition. . .. This penalty
is not to be enlarged by construction. Neither the letter
nor the spirit of the act makes an outlaw of him who violates its prohibition. . . . The deceased no more forfeited
his . . right to the protection accorded by the local law
to a passenger in his situation, than the carrier forfeited its
right of property in the mail car upon which the deceased
rode. His right to safe carriage . . . arose from the fact
that he was a human being, of whose safety the plaintiff in
error had undertaken the charge. With its consent he had
placed his life in its keeping, and the local law thereupon
imposed a duty upon. the carrier, irrespective of the contract of carriage. The Hepburn Act does not deprive one
who accepts gratuitous carriage, under such circumstances,
of the benefit and protection of the law of the State in this

regard."

40

Such instances as the Kirby case have been fairly frequent. 4 '
It took a good bit of teaching to establish that under the filed

rate theory prices and service in the utility field are "no longer
a matter of private contract between the parties. .
"42 Most
of the states agree with the federal courts in refusing to allow

damages for breach, but South Carolina in a recent decision
adopted the immediate business view.
"In Van Auken v. Michigan Cent.

. R., 18z Mich. 33', 148 N. W. 819

(C914); adversely noted in (z15) 13 MIcH. L. PL 328; (1914) 2 VA. L. Rrv.
30o; a divided state court held the traveller not a "passenger" and the company

liable only for wilful injury. See also Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Messina, 240 U. S.
395, 36 Sup. Ct. 368 (i9i6), construing the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 584 (igo6),
49 U. S. C. § i (I926), to the effect that an acceptor of a ride at the invitation of the engineer may be acting unlawfully while the giver railroad is
not, and sustaining the Mississippi court's denial of recovery. The case is
noted in (1916) 29 I-iAv. L. REV. 785; (i916) 16 CoLr L. Rav. 427.
1 See Davis v. Cornwell, :264 U. S. 56D, 44 Sup Ct. 410 (1924), where the
Supreme Court upset a recovery of damages for failure to supply cars at a
set time under an "express contract." Notes (924) 9 MirN. L. REV. 67;
(1924) 3 Tmc. L. Ray. 93; (x922) ig A. L. R. 982, show other cases.
Pollock, D. J., in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Kinkade, 203 Fed. 165, 166
(D. C. Kan. 1912).
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In Strock v. Southern Ry., 43 the court said:
"The recognition of the right of a shipper to make a
contract with a common carrier for cars on a specified day
for the transportation of his property is but the recognition
of an orderly way of transaction of business. It enables the
owner of property to know when to engage laborers for the
purpose of assembling his property for shipment, and further enables him not only to make contracts with laborers
in a businesslike manner, but it enables him to make contracts with parties at a distance for the sale and delivery
of his property to be transported and delivered with some
degree of certainty. Take this right away and you, to a
great extent, deprive the shipper of a market for this property -and thereby indirectly destroy his property, discourage
the production of property, and paralyze business."
The filed rate policy as such is not mentioned. The South
Carolina court discusses the case under a local act which contains prohibitions of preferences corresponding to those in section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act. Until lately, at least, the
federal cases treated the filed rate theory as a means to avoid
preferences rather than an end in itself. In the Kirby case the
Supreme Court said that "for breach of such a contract, relief
will be denied, because its allowance without such publication (in
the tariff) is a violation of the act. It is also illegal because it is
an undiw advantage. ..

- "

44

It is an "undue advantage," however, only if the shipper
profits under it. Where he does not get what he arranged for,
and gets no damages for not getting it, the non-discrimination
policy is completely vindicated, so far as the civil side is concerned. But what if the customer has actually received the advantage "contracted" for and the carrier is in court seeking payment for it?
4 140 S. E. 470, 473 (S. C. 1927).
Under the special contract the railroad
was to place two cars at a named station each Monday from May to Octbber.
The cars were for logs which the plaintiff was cutting on adjoining land, and
the breach alleged was that the railroad bunched the cars so that the plaintiff's
cutting arrangements were upset. The complaint did not recite where the logs
were going, but the court held that it would presume an intrastate haul. A note
.in (x928) 41 HAv.L. REv. io69 considers the result questionable.
"Supra note 35, at 165, 32 Sup. Ct. at 65o. The italics are the writer's.
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In Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Westinghouse Kerr Co.,4 5

the railway was unable to "spot" cars of material consigned to
a building concern. "To remedy this condition the engine and
crew were assigned to the exclusive use of its traffic, payment
to be made therefor as prescribed in the contract." 46 When the
carrier sued to recover "for the use of the engine and crew
rented," the Court said, per Brandeis, J.:

abnormal conditions may relieve a carrier from
liability for failure to perform the usual transportation
services, but they do not justify an extra charge for performing them. The carrier is here seeking compensation in
excess of the tariff rate for having performed a service
covered by the tariff. This is expressly prohibited by the
Interstate Commerce Act (section 6) . . . A contract to
pay this additional amount is both without consideration and
illegal . . . To so insure performance to a shipper was
an undue preference. Hence the contract would be equally
void for illegality on this ground. Davis v. Cornwell, 264
U. S. 56o." 47 Recovery was denied.
Thus the customer not only got a preference, whether or not
he paid for it; but he was not required to pay for the advantage
he got. The case presented the sort of dilemma to which mechanical jurisprudence leads. Under familiar cases, the flied
rate theory makes the customer suffer from the blunders of. the
utility in quoting figures, in reliance on which he irrevocably
concludes business dealings, which his later required payment
of the filed rate turns into loss. 48 The customer also suffers from
failure of the utility to carry out the special contract. The
Westinghouse Kerr case maintains the symmetry of its mechanical application at the expense of the policy it was designed to
vindicate. Surely the end should be more important than the
means to the end.
It would more accurately comport with the objective of the
law to confine judicial blindness to the contract to cases where
'27o U. S. 260, 46 Sup. Ct. 22o (x926).
"Ibid. 26s, 46 Sup. Ct at 221.

'7 ibid.266, 46 Sup. Ct. at
"Supra note

-i, and

221.

infra note r.
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nothing has been accomplished under it. In instances like the
present, the ultimate ends would be better served by enforcing
the contract as made, and rigorously applying the criminal provisions against the violations of the non-discrimination doctrine.
That the customer and the utility must tread the straight
aid narrow way of the filed rate is thus established. That the
Utility Commission itself must do so is the decision in a recent Missouri case. Although the Missouri Supreme Court,
speaking by the sprightly Lamm, has read the Public Utility
Commission's mandate and authority liberally,49 it drew back
from permitting what it felt was a commission-sanctioned discrimination. State ex rel. St. Louis County Gas Co. v. Public
Service Comm.,"0 involved a statute which denied to the utility
power "to extend to any person . . . any privilege or facility
not regularly and uniformly extended to all." 51 The commission
ordered an extension of mains into a theretofore unsupplied district, on terms varying from those of the schedule. This, the
court held the commission could not do.
"A schedule . . . filed . . . acquires the force and
effect of law; and as such is binding upon both the corporation filing it and the public . . . It may be modified or
changed only by a new or supplementary schedule filed voluntarily, or by order of the commission. Such is the construction which has been put upon analogous provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act . . . If such a schedule is
to be accorded the force and effect of law, it is binding, not
only upon the utility and the public, but upon the Public
Service Commission as well. . .. it cannot set them (the
schedules) aside as to certain individuals and maintain them
in force as to the public generally. The gas company cannot (vary them). Neither can the Public Service Commission." 5 2
"State v.Public Service Comm., 259 Mo. 7o4, i68 S. W. i156 (pr:4),
held it might set reasonable rates although thereby upsetting statutory rates.
State v. Public Service Comm., 27o Mo. 429, 192 S. W. 958 (1917), held it

might override municipal powers of regulation. lodged in the city by its charter.
'286 S. W. 84 (Mo. 1926).
5Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1919) § 10478 (12).
Supra note 50, at 86.
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The peculiar difficulties of the fact situations involved in the
extensions of mains, 53 where the future is so unpredictable in its
details that the making in advance of detailed charges becomes
an impossible task, necessarily imposes the granting of an authority to cope with novel situations on their individual terms.
These considerations make the decision unfortunate. Moreover
the prohibition of the statute is directed only against the utility.
If the commission could-as was, of course, conceded-in a
single motion make a new schedule covering all extensions, presumably it might also make a whole schedule over by leaving a
part to stand while making anew another part. The result is a
recession from the former attitude toward the commission's
4

powers.5

B. Non-protection of Contracts Made Prior to Filing of
the Rates
The invalidity of "contracts" made since the filed rate policy
is now clear. "Contracts" made prior to its establishment, and
made without intention of discrimination at the time of their
making, and legally made at that time, are a different phase.
That they might be vehicles of discrimination later, when rate
changes obliged others to pay more, took further teaching, and
not all states accept it. The constitutional provisions against
the impairment of contract have been invoked, but the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Union Dry Goods Co. v.
Georgia Public Service Corp.5 5 proved them to be no refuge
I See New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup. Ct.
and (1918) 27 YALE L. 3. 715.
"The case is discussed in (1927) 1x Mirxr. L. Rnv. 284. The conclusion,

122 (917),

however, is that the decision seems sound.
'248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117 (1919).

See a valuable note on t
topic in (1926) 24 AflcH. L. Rlv. 49z. That the "contracts" were made prior
to the utility's actual engagement in the public business afterward entered into,
did not save them in Fort Smith Spelter Co. v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co.,
267 U. S. 231, 45 Sup. Ct. 263 (1925), from being upset by a rate schedule
subsequently ordered by a state commission, although Texas, etc., P. R. v.
Northside Belt Line, 8 F: (2d) 153 (S. D. Tex. 1925), a4%'d, 48 Sup. Ct. S6x
(1928), held that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not have jurisdiction to grant or withhold a certificate of necessity for the building of a new
road even though its constructor intended to engage in interstate commerce.
As to interstate commerce, the theory of the filed rate and the requirement for
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from the effect of public regulation, so far as federal prohibitions
are concerned. There the local commission confirmed a newly
filed rate, in excess of the figures of a "contract" having three
years still to run. The consumer refused to pay the excess and
sued for specific performance of the "contract." "Private contract must yield to the public welfare" is the gist of the decision. The cases make it clear that the public welfare may be
declared either by statute, commission order, or even by the
utility itself, in filing a new rate which the commission does not
suspend.
The doctrine of the Dry Goods case is followed by the federal commission and courts, 50 and by most of the states, though
questioned by some of the latter. 57 Some, indeed, have repudiated it by express legislation. In Swift & Co. v. Columbia Gar
& Electric Co.,58 the intrastate utility won on a contract although.
it dated from 1916, and it appeared that: "In i919 the Public
Service Commission (created in 191o) approved and put into
effect a schedule of rates . . . which, however, made no provision for special rates for large users of power . . " The

court recites, also, that: "Some time prior to June 20, 1922,
plaintiff (the utility) filed with the commission a schedule .
containing the following statement: '. . . wholesale rate made
by special contract.' "5 No figures were given. The court said:
its payment in money defeats the contracts. See Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 3r Sup. Ct. 265 (1g1), holding that a contract for a
pass annually renewable during life entered into in consideration of a release
for a personal injury claim, was unenforceable against the railway.
rSee New York v. U. S., 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct 239 (1922), where
the Interstate Commerce Commission's rate orders defeated a "charter contrace' of the railroad with the state. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Mottley, supra note
55; and N. Y. C. & H. R. R. v. Gray, 239 U. S. 583, 36 Sup. Ct. 176 (igx6),
dealt with private contracts with the carriers. They denied validity to the
contract, but the Gray case sustained a money recovery for the service.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Gilchrist, 26 F. (2d) 9i2 (S. D. N. Y.
1928), is part of the attempt by the New York transportation system to escape
from the five-cent fare. In the very case the New York Transit Commission
of the Department of Public Service of the state was enjoined from interfering with the proposed raising of fares to seveA cents, despite various contracts
with the city, which, the court held, would yield to .the requirement of the state
utility acts that the rates be just. and reasonable.
67 Schiller Piano Co. v. Ill. Northern Util. Co., 288 Il1. 580, 123 N. E. 631
(g99),
Ii A. L. R. 460 (i92i).
"17 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
s Ibid. 49.
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"It was not a rate made to the public generally, to continue until changed, but was protected as a contract rate
only for the life of the contract by the terms of the statute, which provided:
"'That nothing contained in this act shall authorize
the Railroad Commission to declare any rate, . . . contained in any contract heretofore voluntarily entered into
for a term of years by and between any public utility and
any person, .
to be unreasonable, and non-compensatory, without the consent of both parties to said contract,
said rates, .

. are hereby declared, for the life of said

contracts to be reasonable and compensatory within the
meaning of this Act.'" 0o
The Arkansas Public Utility Act of x921 shows a similar
reaction in favor of protecting the contract, as appears in Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R. R. Comm."1
Where no interstate flavoring enters into the facts states
are thus free to handle the matter as they will. But the injection
of even a little of the magic "interstate" discloses an escape from
state interference, 2 as was evidenced in Public Utilities Comm.
of Rhode Island v. Attleboro S. E. Co.,0a where the contract,
dating from z917, covered service by a Rhode Island power

plant to an Attleboro, Mass., wholesaler, who distributed the
current there to ultimate consumers. Post-war costs created an
operating loss on the service and the Rhode Island Commission
ordered higher rates. This order the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island upset,"" and on writ of certiorari the Federal Supreme
Court agreed that the order was invalid, giving the same reasons
as the state tribunal.
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Sanford said:

0S. C. Acts 19=2,
126I

943 § 3.

U. S. 479, 43 Sup. Ct. 387 (x923).

' But not from federal interference when it enters the field. See New York
v. U. S., 257 U. S. 59i, 42 Sup. Ct 239 (1922), holding that a "charter contract" with the state for a two-cent per mile fare was subject to the Interstate
Commerce Commission's. authority to equalize state and interstate fares,

under the doctrine of Railroad Comm. of Wis. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257
U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (192).
'273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 24 (IM2).
"46 R. I. 496, 129 At!. 495 (1925).
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the sale of electric current by the Narragansett
Company to the Attleboro Company is a transaction in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that the current is delivered at the state line. The transmission of electric current from one state to another, like that of gas, is
interstate commerce, Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 84 W. Va. 662, 669, and its essential character is
not affected by a passing of custody and title at the state
boundary, not arresting the continuous transmission to the
intended destination. People's Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm.,

270

U. S. 550, 554.

"The petitioners contend, however, that the Rhode
Island Commission cannot effectively

. . . regulate the

rates for electricity furnished by the Narragansett Company
to local consumers, without also regulating the rates for the
other service

.

. . , that if the Narragansett Company con-

tinues to furnish electricity to the Attleboro Company at a
loss this will tend to increase the burden on the local consumers and impair the ability of the Narragansett Company.
to give them good service at reasonable prices; and that,
therefore, the order of the Commisison . . . should be

sustained as being essentially a local regulation, necessary
to the protection of matters of local interest, and affecting
interstate commerce only indirectly and incidentally. In
support of this contention they rely chiefly upon Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 252 U. S. 23
and the controlling question presented is whether the present case comes within the rule of the Pennsylvania Gas Co.
case or that of the Kansas Gas Co. case . .
" 63
He concluded: "It is clear that the present case is controlled
by the Kansas Gas Co. case." Il There, on a.similar fact situaSupra note 63, at 86, 47 Sup. Ct. at 295.

"Supra note 63, at 89, 47 Sup. Ct. at 296. The Court says of these cases:
"In the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case, the company transmitted natural gas
by a main pipe line from the source of supply in Pennsylvania to a point of
distribution in a city in New York, which it there subdivided and sold at retail
to local consumers supplied from the main by pipes laid through the streets of
the city. In holding that the New York Public Service Commission might
regulate the rate charged'to these consumers, the court said that while a state
may not 'directly' regulate or burden interstate commerce, it may in some
instances, until the subject-matter is regulated by Congress, pass laws 'indirecty'interest;
affectingthat
suchthecommerce,
when
to protect
or regulate
matters of
local
thing which
theneeded
New York
Commission
had undertaken
transmission, was 'local in its nature:
part of anof interstate
pertaimg
to reglate,towhile
the furnshing
gas to Iocal
consumers, and

the service rendered

to them was 'essentially local,' being similar to that of a local plant furnishing
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tion, the Court had applied the "non-local" label with the consequence of ousting the state regulation.
The Attleboro Company was apparently the only interstate
customer,6 7 although the finding of the Rhode Island Commission is a bit ambiguous as to how far .the others were affected
by its enjoyment of the pre-war figures. Mr. justice Brandeis
made this the point of his dissent:
"The problem is essentially local . . . The Commission found as a fact that continuance of the service to
the Attleboro Company at the existing rate would prevent
the Narragansett from performing its full duty towards its
other customers and would be detrimental to the general
public welfare. It issued the order specifically to prevent
unjust discrimination and to prevent unjust increase in the
price to other customers. The Narragansett, a public service corporation of Rhode Island, is subject to regulation by
that State. The order complained of is clearly valid as an
exercise of the police power, unless it violates the Commerce Clause." 68
And he found no violation.
It will be recalled that when federal authority considers that
a state commission order causes burdening of interstate interests, the federal authority upsets the order. The instant decision
shows that a state lacks power to protect local business, which
may suffer losses on the interstate part of an intrastate and interstate business. Protection in ratemaking is here denied. Presumably protection by authorizing the discontinuance of the interstate part would also be denied to the state authority, although
the Interstate Commerce Commission has protected the interstate
gas to consumers in a city; and that such 'local service' was not of the character which required general and uniform regulation of rates by congressional

action, even if the local rates might 'affect' the interstate business of the com'In the Kansas Gas Co. Case the company, whose business was principally
interstate, transported natural gas by continuous pipe lines from wells in Oklahoma and Kansas into Missouri, and there sold and delivered it to distributing
companies, which then sold and delivered it to local customers." It held "that
the rate which the Company charged for the gas sold to the distributing companies . . . was not subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission of Missouri."
"Note 2 in the opinion does not make this absolutely clear.
'Siupra note 63, at 91, 47 Sup. Ct. at 297.
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portion by ordering the discontinuance of the intrastate part of
a railroad. 69
The result is for the present unfortunate, for, the accidents
of its geography aside, the situation is readily adjustable under
accepted principles. By geographical accident neither state under
the decision has the authority to make the adjustment; and as
the federal government has set up, as yet, no machinery to do
anything, nothing at all is done. The result, however, is a direct
invitation to the entry of the federal authority, and in that aspect shows a silver lining. If the much-talked-of Superpower
Project, hooking up hydro-electric power and power from coal
burned at the mine, comes to reality, the Attleboro case furnishes
a welcome starting point for its only effective scheme of regulation-namely by federal authority-whether by the agency of
the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal Power
Commission 70 is not immediately material.
PAYMENT IN MONEY

The non-discrimination theory as embodied in the filed rate
not only requires that the rate as filed shall be adhered to as a
common denominator, but also that the payment be in money 7 1
"The Narragansett Company is left no authority to which to appeal for
permission to discontinue this unprofitable service to out-of-the-state customers,
even if there were no contract. The federal cases zealously guard the interstate business of the carrier from being saddled with non-paying intrastate matters. See Colorado v. U. S., 271 U. S. '53, 46 Sup. Ct 452 (1926), discussed
by the writer in The.Interacting Areas of Regulatorv Authority in Public
Utilities (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 394, 401. What the state may do to relieve local utilities when interstate feeds unduly upon intrastate business, has
received no attention. Is the answer to be, "Nothing"?
I The case was noted in (i927) 47 Co. L. REv. 615; Note (1927) 15 Gao.
L. REV. 346; (1927) 40 =IfARv. L. REv. 9o6; (1928) 22 Imu L. Rnv. 197; (Wgn7)
36 YAmz L. J. 88r. It is discussed as part of the state-federal problem in the
writer's article, supra note 69, at 417.
" Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 58,
40 Sup. CL 27 (1919), required the consignee to pay a filed rate, although by the
carrier's ojvi mistake a lower rate had been collected. "The purpose of the
Act . . . was to provide one rate . . . and to make the only legal charge
. . . the rate duly filed . . ." Louisville & N. P, IL v. Mottley, supra note

55, at 476, 31 Sup. Ct at 268, refusing validity to a contract to receive current
transportation in return for a past release of a claim on the carrier, said: "And
it cannot be ddubted that the rates . . . specified in such schedule were
payable only in money." So also, as to a plan for transportation bartered
against professional services to railroad employees, by a physician, see State v.
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Variations in the purchasing power of the latter result in the
curious example of mechanical jurisprudence of WashburnCrosby Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry.,72 where the carrier sued
the shipper for a balance claimed to be due on grain, sent from
points in Canada to Minneapolis, which moved under joint tariffs, duly filed by the Canadian and American roads. The rates
were recited in dollars; and at filing, dollars Canadian and dollars American were of interchangeable value. At the time "of
shipment, however, the Canadian dollar had relatively fallen off.
The Canadian carriers, therefore, refused pre-payment7a on
freight bound for the States, while our roads required pre-payment on hauls into Canada, in order, by thus "catching- them
going and coming," always to collect the more valuable United
States dollars.
Having, under protest, paid for the whole haul in United
States dollars, the Crosby Company 74 brought suit on the theory
that, as it was bound to pay for the Canadian haul only Canadian
dollars, or their equivalent in United States money, it had been
charged too much. In the District Court it recovered a judgment which it lost in the Circuit Court of Appeals, where, for the
court, Stone, Cir. J., said:
"When these joint rates . . . were filed . . . both
carriers intended to specify the same value for the service
Martyn, 82 Neb. 225, x1 N. W. 719 (1908).

By special exempting provisions

in, the amendment of June 18, x9io, 36 STAT. 544 (igio), by which telegraph
and telephone and cable companies were swept into the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, they were allowed to exchange services with
common carriers.
16 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
The court explains that the refusal and the demand were authorized by
the respective laws.
"' Three cases were adverted to in which the same question had come
up, but which had gone off against the plaintiffs because the American dollars
had been: paid for the whole haul without protest. If, however, the topic is a
problem in the filed rate theory, which it seems clearly to be, it is hard to see
why protest or no protest has any bearing. If the carrier's mistakes of quotation and collection, etc., do not prejudice the availability to him of the filed
rate, then it is not clear why the shipper's error should prejudice its availability to him. The three cases are New York & Pa. Co. v. Davis, 2 F. (2d)
858 (E.D. Pa. 1f94). aff'd, 9 F. (2d) g9i (C. C. A. 3d, 1926); New York &
Pa. Co. v. Davis, 8 F. (2d) 662 (W. D. N. Y. 1925) ; and Mountain Lumber
'Co. v. Davis, 9 F. (2d) 478 (S.D. N. Y. z925), aff'd, II F. (2d) 2i9 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926).

236

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW .REVIEW

and the result was as intended. Both the (Canadian) Board
and the (Interstate Commerce) Commission understood
this intention and this result. This intention and result was
understood by the public . . . There was no thought that
the charge . . . should fluctuate with changes in value

between the currencies of the two countries and even upon
the same shipment, be different according to the country
in which the charge might be paid. No such uncertainty
would have been tolerated, either by the Board or by the
Commission."
The opinion went on to develop the requirement for certainty, to the conclusion that:
"As the carrriers are bound by the tariffs filed and
cannot depart therefrom, the only practical way in which
this confusion and discrimination could be avoided was to
require all charges to be paid either in Canada or in the
United States. To require payment in Canada, would discriminate against the Canadian carriers and, because the
American carriers are entitled to and are required to demand payment of their part of the charge in United States
money (Abrasive Co. v. Director General, 69 Interst. Com.
Com'n R. 63o), would result in the Canadian carriers re-

ceiving less than their real portion of the divisional charge.
If the shipper has the choice of place of payment, the same
result would follow, as Canada would be chosen by him.
If the payment were made in the United States, the shipper
would pay only the tariff rate although the charge would be
higher than if paid in Canadian money and there would be
no confusion or discrimination between shippers or carriers
and no disturbance of Canadian tariff situations." 75
'Sispr note 72, at 77, 78. Judge Symes dissented. He found nothing in
the Canadian law which gave the Canadian roads more than the money, in
Canadian dollars, which the Canadian tariffs provided; and the practical difficulties arising out of the dislocation of the rate structure which turned the case
with the majority were, he considered, the concern of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and not of the court.
The fluctuation of value between the currencies was considerable; "8 to 17
per cent," remarks the court. It meant that a considerable excess was collected and, under the decision, retained; and its disposal is of interest On this
pint the court says, at 76, that: "The charges in accordance with these joint "
through rates were divided between the Canadian and American carriers on a
percentage basis which was the result of agreement between them and did not
depend entirely on the respective length of hauls in the two countries:' If this
means that not only did the Canadian roads get the equivalent of more Canadian
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Its effect is offset, however, by the recent decision in News
Syndicate Co. v. New York Cent. R. R.71 In this case the newsprint paper for New York City moved from Thorold, Ontario,
some thirty miles over the Canadian National Railways, to a
point in New York, where the New York Central took over the
shipments. The Canadian and United States carriers joined in
publishing a through rate: "No rates were made or published
for the transportation from the international boundary to New
York City." 7 Alleging that these through rates were too high,
the shippers applied to the United States Interstate Commerce
Commission for a revision and reparation, both of which the
Commission granted, and it was on the order for reparation from
the United States carrier that suit was brought. A demurrer,
based on the theory that the order was "void for want of jurisdiction because it dealt solely with charges for transportation
from a point in Canada to a point in the United States" was sustained at trial and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh
Circuit certified to the United States Supreme Court the following questions:
"(i) (under the facts) has the
.
Commission
. . . jurisdiction, on complaint . . . against the United
States railroad alone, to determine the reasonableness of
such joint through rates?
"(2) . . . has the .
Commission, (on finding
it unreasonable) but. in the absence of a finding that the
charges (for the intra-United States haul) were . . . undollars than the Canadian tariffs allowed them, but also that the American
roads get more American dollars than the American tariffs called for, the case
is still less understandable.
The note in (1927) 4o HARv. L. REv. 907, points out that the United States
Interstate Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction to fix a joint rate for
such a transit as the one here involved, but that a joint rate set by the Canadian
Board of Railway Commissioners might be accepted by our Commission as
reasonable. It considers that the court has, in effect, usurped the Canadian
Board's powers and raised the Canadian rates from the origin point to the
border.
See also (r927) iI M ri'. L. REV. 462; (x927) 36 YAmX L. . o7. The
Yale note shows that Canada has a rule corresponding to our own, that the
filed rate in Canadian dollars shall govern. U. S. Surcharge Case, 27 Can.
Ry. Cas. 90, 104 (1921).
'7 275 U. S. 179, 48 Sup. Ct. 39 (x927).
ITIbid. s85, 48 Sup. Ct. at 40.
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reasonable, jurisdiction to make . .
(a reparation order
based on the variances in the through rates) ?
"(3) . . . can a suit (on the order) be maintained
solely against the United States carrier?" 718
By Mr. Justice Butler, the unanimous Court answered "Yes"
to each question:
"The Interstate Commerce Act applies to the lines that
carried, and to the transportation of, the paper from the
international boundary to New York City. It was the
duty of defendants in error to establish just and reasonable
rates for that service. Section I (5); Section 6 (I) and
(7). They failed to make or publish any rate applicable to
that part of the transportation. Section 8 makes them liable for damages sustained in consequences of such failure.
Had the through rate been just and reasonable, no damages would have resulted to plaintiff in error. Its right
to reparation does not depend upon the amounts retained
by defendants in error pursuant to agreed divisions. Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Co., 269 U. S.
217, 231.

.

.

. Their breach of the statutory duty was a

proximate cause of the losses complained of. The failure
to establish rates covering the transportion from the international boundary contravened the provisions of the act
and compelled plaintiff in error to pay the through charges
complained of. The Commission had jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff in error was entitled to an award
of damages under the provisions of this act for a violation thereof." 79
"aSupranote 76, at 184, 185, 48 Sup. Ct. at 39, 40. "The Commission did
not determine," says the Court, "What would be just and reasonable rates for
this transportation within the United States."
I Supra note 76, at x86, 48 Sup. Ct. at 40. He continued: "The Comniision
did not specifically find whether the portions of the charges fairly attributable
to transportation within the United States were excessive to the extent that
the through rates were found unreasonable. While the findings seem to
indicate that the Commission held the entire excess should be charged against
the American lines, we shall consider the question on the basis therein stated.

The Canadian lines furnishing the transportation from Thorold to the international boundary were not before the Commission and were not sued. The
defendants in error participated in the making of the through rate and actually
collected the excessive charges. By their failure to comply with the Act, plaintiff
in error was compelled to pay charges based on the through rates. On the facts
stated, the Commission was authorized to hear the complaint, § 13 (x); and
had jurisdiction to make the order, § x6 (1).1
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ERRORS BY THE CARRIER AND THE FILED RATE

PoLicY

A. Mistake in Filing the Rate
The rate as filed was a clerical mistake in a recent case,
which nevertheless holds that the shipper, at least, may insist
upon the benefit of it. In MagnoliaProvisionCo. v. Beaumont,0
the carriers charged only 23 cents, the figures on file, but a 7ocent figure had been and was meant to be the filed rate, and after
the error was observed, it became again the filed rate. The shipments occurred while item No. 3405 in the filed tariff named a
rate of 23 cents. Denying recovery of the difference to the
carriers, the court said:
"The carriers concede that prima facie the 23-cent rate
is applicable, but they show both by the structure of the
tariff and by the evidence of'F. A. Leland, who compiled
the tariff and caused it to be published, that the 23-cent
rate was never intended to be set out in item No. 3405, but
just below iri No. 341o, and that by the printer's or a clerk's
error this 23-cent rate was put in the No. 3405 bracket and
there left improperly.
"I agree with the carriers that the evidence..
shows plainly that the 23-cent rate was not originally drafted
for the bracket 3405; but I agree with plaintiffs that the
question of what the carriers intended abstractly is wholly
immaterial, and that none of this evidence is relevant to
the issue . . . because in law it is an irrebuttable presumption that a rate filed with the Commission and published is
the lawful rate, and the carrier cannot be heard to dispute
the rate by such claim." 8I
In most of the decisions the blunder of the carrier is the
erroneous statement of a rate which was actually filed as intended to be filed. The customer pays the filed rate regardless

W20 F. (2d) 384 (S. D. Tex. 1927).
3 Ibid. 385. "The decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission," the
court added, "on this point are uniform, and, while no direct opinion of the
Supreme Court determining the matter has been. called to my attention, the

Supreme Court, in Davis v. Portland Seed Company, 264 U. S. 403 ....
approves the Commission's ruling on this point, saying: 'The Commission holds,
for example, that, although the schedule contains a plain clerical error, never-.
-theless'no other charge may be demanded, and the shipper may recover any
excess.'i
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of the blunder, and the carrier is no worse off thereby. 2 The
principal case, however, charges upon the carrier himself the
blunders in filing rates at variance with his intention. If the
variance be wide enough, a result is capable of a reductio ad absurdumn. In a simple contract it may be so large that the acceptor is not aided by the law in claiming contractual rights,
and his insistence is labelled bad faith. Devotion to the filed rate
mechanism should not blind to the public interest in the utility's
welfare. It is entitled to a reasonable rate, and the shipper frequently has enough familiarity with conditions to know something about its figures from past experience. That interest
should protect the utility from its own blunders, if they are so
costly as to imperil its service powers. The instant case itself
might be covered by empowering the commissions to make reparation orders in favor of the utility to the extent of the deficiency below the reasonable rate.
Yet the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding. 3 It
cited the familiar cases and added:
"In Lamb-Fish Lumber Co. v. Y. & M. V. R. R. Co.,
42 I. C. C. 47o , the Interstate Commerce Commission announces the rule that proof of error in the publication of
rates does not justify a departure from the published rates,
even though shippers have full knowledge that the rates
were published by mistake, and that decision was cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Portland Seed
Co., 264 U. S. 403, 424. .-.
. The carriers cannot defend
by showing that published rates, if enforced, would violate
the long and short haul clause and subject them to penalties.
Such a showing would only be evidence of intention indicating that a mistake was made. Because of the policy of
the law, the rate must be abided by as long as it is included
in published schedules of rates. The remedy of the carriers is to apply to the Interstate Commerce Commission
to have the rate changed." 84
'Pittsburgh, etc., :Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 40 SUp. Ct. 27 (1919);
Penn. R. P. v. Titus, 216"N. Y. 17, iog N. E. 857 ('PI).
There are notes
on the topic in (igr8) 18 CoL. L. Rv. -72; ( ''5) 28 HAmv. L. REv. 516;
15 ILL. L. REv. 1o2; (1922) 32 YAmLE L. J. 734.

s326 F. (2d) 2z (C. C. A. 5th,
84
Ibid. 73.

1928).

(92o)
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On October 15, 1928, the Supreme Court of the United
841
States refused certiorari.
B. Mistake in Quoting a Rate Filed
That the rate filed for the service performed must be collected, has become firmly established where the service actually
rendered is the one asked by the customer, and the suit arises
out of the carrier's mis-quotation of the rate on file for it. The
cases are well known.8 5 Their philosophy is that: "It is apparent that . . . (by mistakes real or simulated). a wide door
would be thrown open for an evasion . .
" 8
They have
furnished the typical mechanical applications of the general doctrine that the filed rate means to achieve certainty at the expense
of principles which, in other branches of the law, leave one upon
whose actions others rely to bear the reasonable costs of his own
errors.
Another line of cases deals with mistake as to the service
given, itself. If the service asked in Boston is transportation to
New York, and that mistakenly given is transportation to Chicago, the carrier obviously may not collect for the service rendered. The cases are not so simple as that. They are instances
where service to Chicago is asked and performed and, though
it could have been done over a cheaper route; it was actually
carried out over a more costly one. In these cases the duty on
the carrier to use the cheaper route 'I has been held to bar recovery for the service actually performed.83 Sw.ift & Co. v. New
York Cent. R. R., 80 might be regarded as a case of mis-routing
SU. S. Daily, Oct. x6, 1928, at 2026.
I The decisions most cited are Interstate Commerce cases involving railroads, but the state courts are in accord. A recent case is Kansas Electric P. Co.
v. Thomas, 123 Kan. 321, 255 Pac. 33 (1927), where the utility's suit was opposed unsuccessfully by proof that the consumer had paid all bills as rendered
and knew nothing of the mistakes in them. The court stated at 325, 255 Pac.

at 35, that the cases under the Interstate Commerce Act were its guide. "To
permit an estoppel . . . would permit favoritism and discrimination ...
The lawful rate must be collected:'
"Louisville & N. R. R. v. McMullan, 5 Ala. App. 662, 667, 59 So. 683,
684 (1912).
I Northern Pacific Ry. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477, 38 Sup. Ct 55o (1918).
'Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Lykes Bros., 294 Fed. 968 (S. D. Tex.
-923).
s6 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
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in so far as it condemned the circuitous route. The aggregate
of the two local rates for the long haul was declared not to be,
the charge, although whether that was the haul actually made is
not clear.
In St. Louis S. F. Ry. v. Republic"Box Co.,9 0 if the shipper's directions had been followed the money collected at the destination would have been sufficient. But the railroad so routed
the shipment that the filed rate applicable to the movement was
more, and the last carrier sued for the balance. The defendant
opposed recovery on the ground that ". . . when it placed the
shipment
. . it gave instructions concerning both route and
rate. . ..
Plaintiff insists upon the general principle that the

legal tariff applicable between the points of travel is the only
legal rate .
. ", 1 In denying recovery the court said:
. that, there having been two routes over which the

"..

shipment could have moved, and the shipper having designated the route and the rate, the carrier was just as responsible for the loss to the shipper, and just as little entitled to recover the full legal rate from it, as he was held
to have been 92 .
. and this not only because of the lInterstate Commerce Commission ruling invoked, but because
of the principles announced in the cases referred to." 11
WHo Is LIABLE BOR THE PAYMENT OF THE FILED RATE?

The Republic Box case furnishes also a text for discussion
as to which of the various persons involved is to pay the filed
rate. The carrier may insist upon its payment before he receives or before he parts with the goods, or he may subsequently
collect it froin the person liable to pay it. Business instincts join
with the non-discrimination policy in insisting that it be collected
from some one. Who that person is has furnished some neat
12

F. (2d) 441 (S. D. Tex. 1926).

'Ibid.

442.
' The court here cites Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Lykes Bros., supra
note 88; Louisville & N. 1R. I. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 35 Sup. Ct. 494
(mx5); and St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Spring River Stone Co., 236 U. S. 718,
35 Sup. Ct. 456 (1915).

I Supra note

go, at 443.
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questions. The Republic Box case concerned the shipper's liability to pay a balance, on part of a haul, after the consignee already, on getting the goods, had paid the rate demanded. The
bill of lading read that "the owner or consignee shall pay the
freight," and the defendant argued that the carrier had elected
to accept the "consignee'
liability. On this point the court
said that the:
" . . rule is briefly that a shipper, who does not own
the freight, may at the time of shipment protect himself
against liability by providing that the consignee or the owner
must pay the freight. As said in L. & N. R. R. v. Central
Iron Co., 2.65 U. S. 59 - - . 'Under the rule of the Fink
Case (250 U. S. 577 . . .), if a shipment is accepted,
the consignee becomes liable, as a matter of law, for the
full amount of the freight charges, whether they are demanded at the time of the delivery, or not until later. His
liability satisfies the requirements of the Interstate Comzmerce Act (Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.).' . .
"This being the law, if the facts in any case warrant
the court in finding that the railroad company has looked
to the consignee, and not the shipper, it is competent for the
court to hold that the facts establish either that the shipper
is not liable at all, or is liable only secondarily and upoa a
showing by adequate proof that all proper steps have been
taken in vain against the consignee." o4
Thus the shipper or consignor may drop out of the transaction, although in Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Iron &
Coal Co.9 5 Brandeis, J., speaking for the Court, said:
"Ordinarily, the person from whom the goods are received for shipment assumes the obligation to pay the freight
charges; and his obligation is ordinarily a primary one. This
is true even where the bill of lading contains, as here, a provision imposing liability upon the consignee. -Forthe shipper is presumably the consignor; the transportation ordered
by him is presumably on his own behalf; and a promise by
Supra
9D,44atSup.
442. Ct. 441 (1924).
_'65 U. note
S. 59,
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him to pay therefor is inferred (that is, implied in fact) as
a promise to pay for goods is implied, when one orders them
from a dealer. But this inference may be rebutted, as in
the case of other contracts. It may be shown, by the bill
of lading or otherwise, that the shipper of the goods was
not acting on his own behalf; that this fact was known by
the carrier; that the parties intended not only that the consignee should assume an obligation to pay the freight
charges, but that the shipper should not assume any liability
whatsoever therefor; or that he should assume only a secondary liability." 01
In this case, the Central Coal & Iron Company,97 sold coke
to Tutwiler & Brooks, deliverable f. o. b. cars at the Coal & Iron
Works, and the immediate buyers resold to an ultimate buyer in
Arizona. The Central Company then became shipper in the sense
that it started the transit, but the bill of lading was taken to the
order of Tutwiler & Brooks, and was by them indorsed over
to the Arizona people, who received the goods on payment of the
$5ooo freight charge demanded. Three years later the carrier
found that under the tariff it should have charged $850o. Acting on the principles above, the Court let the Central Coal & Iron
Company out, and was left to interpret a bill of lading which
read "consigned to Order Of Tutwiler and Brooks . . . Destination Mayer, Arizona . . . Notify Great Western Smelters
Corporation . . . owner or consignee shall pay the freight." 98
Ibid. 67,44 Sup. Ct. at 443.
Mr. Justice Brandeis says, in note 3 of that case: "See Interstate Commerce Commission Conference Ruling No. 314, Bulletin No. 7, issued August
1, 1917: 'The law requires the carrier to collect and the party legally responsible

to pay the lawfully established rates without deviation therefrom. It follows
that it is the duty of carriers to exhaust their legal remedies in order to col-

lect undercharges from the party or parties legally responsible therefor. It
is not for the Commission, however, to determine in any case which party,
consignor or consignee, is legally liable for the undercharge, that being a question determinable only by a court having jurisdiction and upon the facts of each
case.' This ruling, which was adopted May 3, 1gr1, and 'interpreted' May 4,
1918, was amended, on March 6, 1922, by calling attention to the provision
inserted in the Uniform Domestic Bill of Lading prescribed October 21, 1921.
By that provision the consignor may (see Section 7 of Conditions and clause
on face of bill) relieve himself of all liability for freight charges. In the Malter
of Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671, 721; 64 1. C. C. 347; ibid. 357; 66

I. C. C. 63.!
"Supro note 95, at 64, 44 Sup. Ct. at 442.
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The Great Western had become insolvent. The discussion makes
it pretty clear that the Court considered Tutwiler & Brooks to be
the consignee, for it invites the road to look to them, remarking
that: "There was no suggestion that (they) were insolvent." 9
If they had been, rather than the "notify" party who actually
received the goods, what then?
In the very case the "notify" party received the goods in

Arizona as endorsee and holder of the bill-as owner-so that in
the event that Tutwiler & Brooks were not "good" and the westerners were, suit would lie against the latter. This was held in a
recent case, Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry.,1 °0
in which, summarizing the various decisions working out the
policy of the Elkins Act, and of section 6 of the Commerce
Act, 101 the court said:
"The Central Warehouse Company was not the consignee of the goods, but the bill of lading was indorsed to
it. Its title to the property was the same as that of the consignee. Whatever obligations were imposed upon the original party to the contract of carriages was necessarily assumed by the plaintiff in error when it accepted the bill of
lading and demanded the possession of the car of sugar." 102
In that very case the court made a brutal application of the
filed rate policy, for the bill of lading which the Central Company bought had been marked "prepaid' by the initial carrier,
and everybody at the destination relied on this recital at the
time of the delivery to the Central Company. Moreover, the
shipper was insolvent and unable to repay the Central Company, which had already remitted to him the proceeds of the
shipment less charges.la
"Supra note 95, at 65, 44 Sup. Ct. at 442.
2032o F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).

'In Great Northern Ry. v. Hyder, 279 Fed. 783 (S. D. Wash. x922) ; Western
& Atlantic R. . v. Underwood, 281 Fed. 89x (N. D. Ga. xg22); Davis v.
Akron Co., 296 Fed. 675 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Cincinnati Northern .y.v..
Beveridge, 8 F. (2d) 372 (E. D. Va. 1925). For the Elkins Act see supra
note 15. For § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and its numerous amendmeats, see supra note 8, and 49 U. S. C. § 6 (1926).
12 Supra note ioo, at 829.
I The Central Warehouse Co. was a commission house. It disposed of
the goods for account of the shipper and remitted, less deductions. But the corn-
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In Dare v. New York Cent. R. R..,'

4

the Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit played another variation on the
perils of one who loans money on a bill of lading as security. The
bill in question was for the railroad haul from Illinois to New
York City, on bills of lading running to various consignees in
New York City, whose commission house was the Brainard
Commission Company.

"The bills .

.

. were indorsed in blank

by the consignees and were pledged to the defendants (the Dares)
as security for money loaned by them to the Brainard Commission Company. The defendants then delivered them to the plaintiff railroad, with instructions to deliver the oats 'for our account' to named vessels for export (on terms of) 'freight and
all charges collect from Brainard Commission Company.' The
plaintiff made delivery to the vessels as ordered, and presented
freight bills to the Brainard Commission Company. Finding it
insolvent and unable to pay, the plaintiff demanded payment from
the defendants," 105 who meantime had released the new shipping documents to the Brainard Commission Company upon payment of the loan. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the relations between the Dares and the Brainards; and neither the
plaintiff nor the defendants knew that the latter were insolvent.
To the argument that the Fink, the Central Coal & Iron Co.,
and the York & Whitney cases ' 06 were inapplicable, because the
Dares were only pledgees for security, the court replied that the
fact was "immaterial." -07 It will be noted that the question is
not as to the ocean freight bill, which the railroad had paid to the
mission houses had definitely lost the fight in New York Central R. R. v.

York & Whitney Co., 256 U. S. 406, 41 Sup Ct. 509 (1921), where although
the commission house did just as it did in the instant case, the Supreme Court
said, at 408, 41 SuP. Ct at 51o, that "the transaction . . .
amounted to
an assumption . . . to pay the only lawful rate."
lot2o F. (2d) 37o (C. C. A. 2d, 1927)u5 Ibid. 38o.
16Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. Fink, supra note 82; Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Central Iron & Coal Co., jpra note 95; New York Central R. P. v. York &
Whitney Co., supra note .xo3.
"'The result is approved in (1928) 28 Co. L. RFv. 96, which says that
in view of the number of indorsements which may appear on a bill of lading,
it seems fair to make the indorsee who secures the delivery liable, although
the American Bill of Lading Act, unlike that of England, does not make mere
endorsement a transfer of liability as well as of rights.
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steamer. The Dares undoubtedly owe the New York Central
for that. The decision is that a banker who advances money to
a commission house on a collection of blank bills becomes liable
for the freight charges unless he takes the precautions which the
court indicates. The gist of the case seems to be: "So far as the
plaintiff knew the defendants were owners of the shipments.
They held order bills of lading duly endorsed . . . We see no
reason why the holder should not -stand in the shoes of the consignee in respect to the obligation to pay freight upon delivery
to him. At least this should be true where the carrier does not
know that the holder of the indorsed bill is not the owner." 'zo
Purchasers or receivers of transported goods who take them
directly from the carrier's hands should tread warily.10 9 The
pursuit of the ultimate payer has been so far overdone that Congress has allowed in its field a measure of self protection for
agents. A recent amendment to paragraph 2 of section 3 of the
Interstate Commerce Act adds:
"Where carriers are instructed by a shipper or consignor to deliver property . . . to a consignee other than
the shipper or consignor, such consignee shall not be legally
liable for transportation charges . . . which may be found
'mSupra note 104, at 38o. A note in (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 8g discusses
the Central Warehouse case; and the whole topic of who is liable for the
charges is covered by a note in (z95) 23 Mick. L. REv. 657 to Nashville, C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Gilliam, 212 Ala. i20, zoi So. 889 (z!4).
A consignee who had received lumber which he had ordered from a house
in St Louis and who was prepared for a bill for freight from St. Louis was
startled later to receive a bill for a sum, seven times greater, covering charges
which had piled up from the origin point far beyond the Missouri city. The
Ohio court mercifully refused to let the railroad collect the bill from the consignee. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. McKenzie Lumber Co., 112 Ohio St 8o,
147 N. E. 8 (r25) ; (zgz5) :2o Iu-

L. REv. 372.

-

" In a recent New York decision, Erie R. R. v. Rosenstein, 222 App. Div.
509, 510, 227 N. Y. Supp. 99, 10o (1928), the commission merchant, who in the
very case was not known to the carrier to be such, "accepted . . . merchandise shipped under a straight bill -of lading, naming the consignor as consignee." There was the usual carrier's error as to the amount due. Despite
the argument that he "is neither the owner, nor the consignor, nor the consignee named in the bill," the court held the commission man liable for the
tariff rate, adopting, as to an attempted distinction between a. straight and an
order bill, the language of a former decision that, "The difference . . .
lies in the duty which rests upon the railroad. . . . The rule as to freight
charges, however, remains the same in both cases." Ibid. Citing the Dare case,
mspra note 104, on the liability of one to whom delivery is made, it said: "That
-Dare held an endorsed bill of lading is (merely) a factual difference." Ibid.
5 227y, N. Y. Supp. at 10I.
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to be due after the property has been delivered to him (a)
if the consignee is an agent only and has no beneficial title
. and (b) prior to delivery
has (so) notified
the delivering carrier in writing." 110
EXCUSES FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THE

I-LED RATE

A. "Act of God" or "Vis Major"
The sacrifices upon the altar of ready administration which
arise out of the application of the filed rate doctrine to the subject of demurrage may be briefly considered. The debates arise
on whether the amount filed is collectible, not only when the delays can be ascribed to the acts or defaults of the deliveree of
the cars, but also when they are due to the acts of others, or to
circumstances humanly unwilled and uncontrolled. "Wrongful
acts," "act of God," "vis major," and like phrases come to mind
by way of description of the instances. In Southern Ry. v.
White, i n1 the railway's suit was resisted on the ground -that after
the cars had been placed on the defendant's logging track a washout of a bridge prevented their prompt return. The court considered the obligation to return or pay a duty imposed by law,
and applied, in the defendant's favor, the doctrine of "impossibility" by "act of God."
'7044 STAT. z447 (x927). On the general topic of who must pay, it provides:
"(2) No carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of this Act shall
deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight transported by
it until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such
rules and regulations as the commission may from time to time prescribe to
govern the settlement of all such rates and charges and to prevent unjust discrimination. Where carriers by railroad are instructed by a shipper or consignor
to deliver property transported by such carriers to a consignee other than the
shipper or consignor, such consignee shall not be legally liable for transportation charges in respect of the transportation of such property (beyond those
billed against him at the time of delivery for which he is otherwise liable)
which may be found to be due after the property has been delivered to him, if
the consignee (a) is an agent only and has no beneficial title in the property,
and (b) prior to delivery of the property has notified the delivering carrier
in writing of the fact of such agency and absence of beneficial title, and, in the
case of a shipment reconsigned or diverted to a point other than that specified
in the original bill of lading, has also notified the delivering carrier in writing
of the name and address of the beneficial owner of the property. In such
cases the shipper of consignor, or, in the case of a shipment so reconsigned
or diverted, the beneficial owner, shall be liable for such additional charges,
irrespective of any provisions to the contrary in the bill of lading or in the
contract under which the shipment was made."
2U284 Fed. s6o (C. C. A. 6th, z922).
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A prior federal case, however, denied him the refuge of
"impossibility" by "act of man," where the violence of strikers
in the consignee's plant caused the. local authorities to shut up his
shop until the arrival of militia. In Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Schaff, Receiver of M. K. T. Ry.,112 the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit said:
"In view of the prohibitions of the statute, it is clear
that courts are equally (with the Commerce Commission)
without power to release parties from obligation of tariffs
providing for demurrage charges on the ground that such
charges have been occasioned by a strike. Congress alone
has the power to write such an exception into the statute."
On the other hand the West Virginia court was able to relieve the defendant of the duty to pay for the delay in Chesapeake
& Ohio R. R. v. P, T. Board.113 The court "distinguished" the
Sinclair Refining case on 'the ground that, as there the strike
was one among the defendant's own employees, it was "within
the power of the employer to prevent or stop the strike by
coming to terms with his employees." In the case before it:
"At the time the cars were placed at Hansford and
during the entire time for which the demurrage was charged
men in the number of many hundreds, perhaps thousanids,
engaged in what became commonly known as the 'Armed
March' on Logan County. During the continuance of this
march, armed participants therein patrolled and were in
complete charge of the public highways and railroad tracks
in the vicinity of Hansford. . . . Civil authority failed,
and the uprising continued until it was quelled by United
States troops" 114
It declared that the railroad's suit for $365 claimed under
the published tariffs failed, and held that where the law creates
the duty, the law provides an exception under the doctrines developed in Paradinev. Jane,11"5 and more recent cases, which are
set forth. The "armed march" was a vis major, and "it (the
"^-275 Fed. 769, 774 (C. C. A. 8th, i92i).
"'ioo ,V.Va. 222, 224, 130 S. E. 524, 525 (1925).
Ibid. 223, .130 S. E. at 524.
"*Aleyn :27, 82 Eng. Repr. 897 (i68i).
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demurrage charge) was designed to prod the slothful shipper
and not to oppress one who is unable to perform by reason of a
vis major."
The question of who is to pay the filed rate has evoked
decisions as to demurrage also. The efficiency plan of a number of carload coal receivers furnishes Eminmos Coal Mining
Co. v. Norfolk & Western Ry.11 6 There a so-called "pooling
exchange" was organized at the Lambert's Point yard at tidewater, whereby the incoming coal was graded before it entered
the limits, and the participants in the pool agreed that, without
going through the labor and expense of sorting out cars, each
member's orders should be filled out of conveniently reachable
cars of equal grade. Cars consigned to the Emmons Company,
having been unloaded to satisfy orders of another, whose cars
were in turn reserved in equal quantity for the Emmons Company and later used by them, the question was who should pay
the demurrage on the reserved cars. The Court answered that
the Emmons Company should do so.
A more recent case of the same general sort involved an
efficiency program whereby various mines during a car shortage:
"
.
adopted a practice by which the cars, as soon as
loaded, were shipped from the mines to Russell without formal billing, but only on cards or tickets. There they were
weighed, the railroad company was supplied with the name
of the consignee, and they were shipped out on a B/L as if
directly from the mines to destination. At this time the general demurrage rules required demurrage to be paid upon any
cars held by or for shippers beyond the minimum limit, but
the car distribution rules provided that, if the mine did not
use all of its quota delivered to it on one day, the remainder
should'be charged against its quota for the next day, and
the general demurrage rule was displaced at the mines by
this distribution rule." 117
Later the demand for coal fell off so that cars were delayed
at Russell, Ky., and the carrier, in Main Island Creek Coal Co.
u18272 U. S. 709, 47 Sup. Ct. 254 (I927).
'IT

Main Island Creek Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 23 F. (2d) 248,

249 (C. C. A. 6th, x928).
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v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R.," 8 sued to recover demurrage. Two
points are of interest. One concerned the tariff clause which
excepted from demurrage "cars under load with coal at such
mines, mine sidings, etc.," and the coal company's claim that
"these Russell yard tracks (perhaps one hundred miles away)
by usage had become mine sidings." 109 Conceding this as to the
emergency period, the court denied it on the present facts, and
ruled that demurrage was due. Since the object of the exception
plainly was that the shipper who had done his part should not
pay the carrier for the latter's own delay in getting the cars
away, the ruling seems unimpeachable. The court said that the
emergency.measures "'contemplated no storage of cars at Russell
and there was none. The storage . . . in question" here arose
because "it was entirely optional with defendant whether it would
continue (under the earlier) method" or limit its shipments to
its sales.120 The delays were obviously at the shipper's door. 1' 1
The second point of interest is that "it is said that by collecting from the consignee the regular freight charges from the
mines to destination, without demand of demurrage, the railroad
company waived or became estopped to assert any demand against
consignor, as owner, for this demurrage." 122 The court an23
swered with the Fink, and Central Coal & Iron Co. cases,'
"which hold that no act of the carrier can estop it from enforcing
' Ibid.
*Ibid.:249.
SIbid. :249.
the methods of collecting demurrage, a recent federal decision
'=On
covers the case of a ship unloading lumber into cars for transport to an ultimate buyer, Dorsey, who delayed starting the cars. Dorsey finally agreed to
accept the delivery so far as the ocean carrier was concerned, but refused
to pay the railroad demurrage charges which the ship itself had paid in
order to be free to make delivery. The decision in California & Eastern
S. S. Co. V. I38,000 Feet of Lumber, 23 F. (2d) 95, 96 (D. C. Md. 1g2),
is that a libel in. rem against the lumber does not lie since the transaction
"is one not relating to any charges connected with the vessel's services." Incidentally the court also, characterized the payment of the charges by the
ship as "voluntary," saying at 97, that, "A railroad normally, in the absi-ice
of special arrangement, would have no claim which it could assert against
the vessel or her owner, because its rights would lie against the shipper or consignee of the lumber."
'Supra note z7, at 249.
'Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. FhW sapra note 87; Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Cent. Iron & Coal Co., supra note 95.

252

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

payment of the full amount," 124 and said that the bill of lading
in the case made no exemption of the shipper.
B. Set-offs, etc., and the Statute of Limitations
Certain general policies in the law-such as that of set-off
and the statute of limitations-may conflict with this obligation
on the utility and user to collect and to pay the filed rate. As to
set-off the present decisions are "in hopeless conflict." 125 In
Pennsylvania R. R. v. South Carolina Produce Association,12"
where the carrier's demand for freight charges in interstate transportation was met by a counterclaim for damage to the shipment,
the railroad demurred insisting that the claim "must be sued upon
separately .

.

. because of the public policy inherent in the

Interstate Commerce Act."
With this the court agreed. Judge Cochran said: "While
. . . there is no Supreme Court decision directly in point, never-

theless I am of opinion that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court furnish a sufficient and logical guide by which we
may reach a correct solution of the question." 127 It relied upon
the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 6 in the Mottley
case,128 and the series following it. On the other hand, in Chi"'Supranote

117, at 250.
Cochran, D. J., in the case next cited, says, at 316:
"There is no decision directly in point by the Supreme Court of the United
States, nor by any of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the decisions of the
District Courts and of the state courts are in hopeless conflict. The following
cases hold that the counterclaim may be lawfully interposed: Wells-Fargo &
Co. v. Cuneo (D. C.) 241 F. 727; Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Tecktonius
Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 262 F. 715; Payne v. Clarke (D. C.) 271 F. 525; Battle v.
Atkinson, 9 Ga. App. 488, 71 S. E. 775; Central, etc., v. Birmingham, etc.,
9 Ala. App. 419, 64 So. 202; Nashville, etc., v. Tennessee Mill Co., 143 Tenn.
237, =7 S. W. 443; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Bellinger, iox Misc. Rep. 1o5, 166
N. Y. S. 65z; N. Y. Central R. Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 2o App.
Div. 467, E94 N. Y. S. 467.
"The following cases hold that such a counterclaim cannot be interposed
in an action of this character: I. C. R. Co. v. Hoopes (D. C.) 233 F. 135;
C. & N. W. R. Co. v. Stein (D. C.) 233 F. 716; Johnson-Brown Co. v.
Railroad (D. C.) 239 F. 59o; Oregon-Washington Railroad & Nay. Co. v.

Cascade Contract Co., ioi Or. 582, 197 P. 1oB5, 1o88, 200 P. 1034; D., L. &

W. R. R. v. Nuhs, 93 N. J. Law, 3og, ii A. 223; Adams Express Co. v.
Albright Bros., 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 4io; N. Y. S. W. R. R. Co. v. Ruthven, 88
Pa. Super. Ct. 5o."
'125 F. (2d) 315 (E. D. S. C. 1928).

nIMd. 316.
28Sipra note yx.
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cago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Pioneer Grain Corp.,1 29 Judge Sanborn,
of the District Court in Minnesota, said, in denying a motion to
strike out the counterclaim:
"At best the question is a'very doubtful one. Granting
that the plaintiff could not by any agreement with the defendant offset its cause of action against that of the defendant, does it necessarily follow that it would be unlawful or
contrary to public policy that both causes of action should be
submitted at the one time to the same court and the same
jury and determined in the one action? It may be that no
shipper should be permitted to set up a counterclaim in such
a proceeding, but there seems to be no statutory prohibition
of it; and if each cause of action is properly determinedand there is certainly no presumption that it will not beit is difficult to see how discrimination will follow, or how
the ultimate result. will differ from what it would be if the
causes of action were tried separately.
"In any event, and particularly in view of the fact that
the cause of action set up as a counterclaim by the defendant cannot now be asserted in a separate action because of
the running of the statute of limitations, it seems to me that
the motion should be denied at this time. After a trial on
the merits-if the defendant should prevail with respect to
the counterclaim-the question now presented could be
finally settled on appeal."
Where the claim for demurrage was met by a counterclaim
for delay in an intrastate transit, a Missouri court, in St. Louis
S. P. Ry. v. Morga.,': 0 applied the general filed rate doctrines
to the "legally published tariffs approved by the Public Service
Commission of Missouri," and on the special problem of set-off
agreed with Judge Cochran. He followed a prior decision which
said:
"We held that estoppel could not be pleaded as a defense in an action by a carrier to recover a balance of transportation charges due on an interstate shipment. There
we also considered by way of analogy the counterclaim
M26

F.

(2d) 9o (D.

C.

Minn.

1928).

1"297 S. W. 717 (Mo. App. I927). It is discussed in

(1928) 28 Cot. L. R'v.
The latter considers that the holding is not a sufficient bar to discrimination to justify the loss of economy.

.112.
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question, and expressed our opinion as to the right to plead
a counterclaim in such case. . . .and what we there said
respecting the defense of counterclaim we think sound and
more in keeping with the letter and spirit of the law denouncing unjust discrimination than are the cases to the
contrary." U
Yet the Commerce Act provides for the application of the Statute of Limitations to the carriers' claims,'3 2 although one might
suppose that the general policies outlined here would oppose any
time limit against the non-collecting carrier.
'=Supranote

13o, at 718.
I See legislation referred to supra note n1o.

